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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL C. MARTIN, : Case No. 20070426-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (2008). Appellant Michael Martin was convicted of one count of criminal 
mischief, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-106 (2003) and 76-3-
402(1) (Supp. 2006). The judgment of conviction and Memorandum Decision correcting 
the judgment are attached together hereto as Addendum A. (See R. 131-33; 136-39). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether a timely notice of appeal from a corrected judgment of conviction is 
sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction over the appeal. 
Standard of Review: Issues regarding appellate jurisdiction are questions of law 
reviewed for correctness. In re Estate ofPahl 2007 UT App 389, ^ 9, 174 P.3d 642; see 
also Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, ^  15, — P.3d — (stating that 
"^jurisdictional questions are likewise legal issues that we review for correctness"). 
B. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Martin violated the conditions 
of the plea agreement, which were ambiguous; and whether the parties should be returned 
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to their original pre-plea status due to the ambiguities in the agreement. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review the issue for an abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 
991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Also, it will review the trial court's factual determinations 
under a clearly erroneous standard, and it will review conclusions of law for correctness. 
See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. 
Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that the evidence failed to 
support a probation violation). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
With respect to the first issue on appeal, on July 18, 2007, this Court filed a "Sua 
Sponte Motion for Summary Judgment" to dismiss Martin's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. On August 27, 2007, the State and Martin filed papers with the Court in 
response to the sua sponte motion. Thereafter, on August 31, 2007, this Court issued an 
Order withdrawing the sua sponte motion, and it requested that the parties "include a 
discussion of the issues related to jurisdiction in their briefs for full consideration by the 
[Cjourt." (See Addendum B, hereto). The first issue on appeal addresses jurisdiction as 
requested in Addendum B. 
The second issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 197. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum C: Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4 (2008); Utah R. Crim. P. 11, 22(e), & 30 (2008); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l, et. seq. (2003 & Supp. 2007). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This matter began as a dispute between neighbors, and 
resulted in charges against Martin for two counts of criminal mischief. In November 
2004, the State filed an Information, charging count one as a second degree felony 
offense and count two as a third degree felony offense. (R. 3-5). The State alleged that 
Martin tore down a fence and cut down an elm tree belonging to his neighbor, Kathryn 
Randazzo. (Id.) On December 22, 2004, the trial court ordered Martin to have "no 
contact with" Ms. Randazzo. (R. 9). 
Course of the Proceedings: On September 29, 2005, the State and Martin entered 
into an agreement to resolve the criminal case. (R. 51-58). Pursuant to the agreement, 
the State dismissed count one (the second degree felony offense), and Martin entered a 
no-contest plea on count two (the third degree felony offense). (R. 51). The factual basis 
for the no-contest plea was as follows: "I removed a fence that I believed was impeding a 
right of way that I believed I had to remove. I also removed a tree that I believed to be 
impeding the right of way." (R. 52). 
The trial court agreed to hold the plea on count two in abeyance for one year on 
the condition that "the defendant replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that 
defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a 
licensed third party." (R. 55\ see also R. 188:7, 10-13). 
After the parties entered into the agreement and over the course of the next several 
months, the parties were back in court: Martin wanted to withdraw the no-contest plea in 
abeyance and Ms. Randazzo had complaints about the repair work that Martin was 
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supposed to complete. Specifically, on Monday, October 31, 2005, Martin filed a letter 
with the court, asking to change his plea. (See R. 63); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2)(b) (Supp. 2007) (stating that a motion to withdraw a plea in abeyance "shall be made 
within 30 days" of a no contest plea); Utah R. Crim. P. 2(a) (2008) (stating when the "last 
day of the period" to act "is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday" that day shall not be 
included in computing the period in time in which a party must act). 
Next, the parties appeared in court on January 13, 2006, due to complaints from 
Ms. Randazzo about Martin. (See R. 79). Ms. Randazzo complained that Martin had 
been on the property doing work, and she complained about the quality of the fence. (R. 
195). Martin denied that he had been on the property. (R. 195:9). The court ordered 
Martin that he may not go onto Ms. Randazzo's property, and it set the matter for a 
"restitution hearing." (R. 195:9-10). 
On February 21, 2006, the court held another hearing. (R. 81; 193). It 
acknowledged Martin's October 31 letter and considered it to be a motion to withdraw 
the guilty plea. (R. 193:4-5). The court scheduled the matter for additional proceedings. 
(R. 193). Also, the prosecutor asked the court to advise Martin that he remained under 
the jurisdiction of the court, and "you have contempt power if he violates your order and 
goes on[to] that property — ". (R. 193:8). The court ordered Martin that he would be 
charged with trespass if he went onto the property. (R. 193:9). 
The next hearing was May 12, 2006. (R. 107). At that hearing, the court asked 
Martin, "[Do] you really want me to set aside your plea?" (R. 189:3). Martin answered, 
"No." (R. 189:3). The trial court then ruled it would "strike" the motion to withdraw the 
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plea. (R. 189:4). The court also asked if Martin had done the work under the plea 
agreement. Counsel for Martin responded that "we haven't tendered the elm tree, which 
[Ms. Randazzo] didn't want." (R. 189:2). The prosecutor did not dispute that 
representation. (R. 189:3). Rather, he indicated that a motion needed to be filed. (R. 
189:4). Also, the court explained that Martin needed to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the plea agreement so that the case could be dismissed. (R. 189:4-5). 
On July 28, 2006, the state filed papers for an order to show cause why Martin 
should not be found in violation of the plea agreement. (R. 108-110). 
Disposition in the Court Below. On January 19, 2007, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause and ruled that Martin was in violation of 
the terms and conditions of the plea agreement. (See R. 124-25). It then "revoked" or 
terminated the plea in abeyance and set the matter for sentencing. (Id.) 
On March 9, 2007, the court continued sentencing to permit the defense to renew 
"[the] possibility of [filing a] Motion to Withdraw Plea." (R. 126). 
On April 20, 2007, Martin tried again to withdraw the guilty plea. (R. 192:5-7, 
16). The court denied the motion (id.) and entered judgment against Martin for criminal 
mischief. The court sentenced Martin to probation for 24 months. (See R. 131-33; 
192:16-19). 
The entry of judgment incorrectly made reference to two charges: count "1 . 
Criminal Mischief- 3rd Degree Felony," and count "2. Criminal Mischief- Class A 
Misdemeanor." (See R. 131-33; 192:16-19; see also R. 51 (reflecting that count one 
would be dismissed as part of the plea agreement)). 
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On May 8, 2007? the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision to clarify and 
correct the entry of judgment. (See R. 136-39). According to the Memorandum 
Decision, the trial court vacated the sentence on count one; it entered a conviction for a 
class A misdemeanor offense on count two; and it set aside sentencing and ordered 
further proceedings for purposes of restitution. (R. 138-39). 
On May 21, 2007, Martin filed a pro se notice of appeal from the conviction. (R, 
141). On May 25, 2007, the State filed a Motion for Restitution. (R. 143-44). 
On June 8, the trial court granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw and it 
appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to represent Martin on appeal. (R. 154). 
On June 8, 2007, Martin filed a second or amended notice of appeal. (R. 159). 
The original notice of appeal is proper and timely. See_ Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4 
(2008). Martin is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated supra, this matter originally began as a dispute between neighbors. As a 
result of the dispute, the State filed an Information against Martin for two counts of 
criminal mischief; it alleged that he tore down a fence in Ms. Randazzo's backyard and 
cut down an elm tree. (See R. 3-5). 
Several months after the State filed the charges, the parties entered into a plea 
agreement. The State agreed to dismiss count one of the Information, and Martin agreed 
to enter a no-contest plea to count two. (R. 51-58). Also, the trial court agreed to hold 
the plea on count two in abeyance for one year on the condition that "the defendant 
replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that defendant removed[,] and replace 
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the shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a licensed third party." (R. 55; see_ 
also R. 188:7, 10-13). 
On July 28, 2006, the State filed papers for an order to show cause why Martin 
should not be found in violation of the plea in abeyance agreement. (R. 108-110). 
According to the papers, Martin violated the plea agreement by "entering the [neighbor's] 
property and replacing the fence himself." (R. 109, % 2). Also, the State alleged that 
Martin "failed" to have a damaged tree stump removed from the property prior to 
restoring landscape. (Id., ^ 3). It claimed that Martin failed to have the work "completed 
by a licensed, third party professional." (Id.) And it claimed that Martin failed to 
"replace the foliage that was taken commensurate in value to the one destroyed." (Id, ^ 
4). According to the papers, the original tree that was damaged "was a well established 
tree valued at the time around $4,000.00. The defendant replaced the tree with a sapling 
valued at approximately $25.00." (Id.) 
On January 19, 2007, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the order to show 
cause. (R. 197). During the hearing, Ms. Randazzo discussed the fence, the tree and the 
foliage in her yard. (R. 197:5-6). She acknowledged that the fence had been replaced. 
(R. 197:10). However, she claimed the posts were uneven, the gate did not close 
properly, the fence bowed in the middle, and it was not on her property line. (R. 197:10, 
17-19, 24; but see R. 197:26). In addition, according to Ms. Randazzo, she had not been 
contacted by a third-party licensed contractor to do any of the replacement work. (R. 
197:7, 10). 
Ms. Randazzo acknowledged she had received a replacement tree. However, she 
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complained that the old tree stump had not been removed, and the original elm had not 
been replaced with a mature tree of commensurate value. (R. 197:7-9,26). Instead, she 
received a sapling valued at $29.97. (R. 197:8-9). 
Also, Ms. Randazzo acknowledged foliage and vines now (R. 197:27), where 
vines originally were destroyed. (R. 197:19-20). 
After Ms. Randazzo testified, the prosecutor called additional witnesses. He 
called Stacey Poppleton, Ms. Randazzo's neighbor, to testify that she had seen Martin 
"fiddling" with an end cap or fmial on a corner post of the fence in the fall or winter of 
the previous year. (R. 197:32-33, 36). And he presented evidence from Joseph Johnson 
concerning the value of destroyed foliage. (R. 197:40). 
Martin then testified in his defense. He discussed the chain-link fence and foliage. 
With respect to the fence, Martin maintained that he replaced it and reinforced it with 
help from a third-party licensed electrician "slash handyman," Evan Lee. (R. 197:47, 
48). A letter from Lee stated that he assisted in installing the fence; also he was a 
licensed electrician. (R. 197:48, 51; Defendant's Exhibits 5 & 7). Martin acknowledged 
that Lee and he did the work on the fence together; he assisted when needed; and he was 
able to assist without trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. (R. 197:49-50, 52-53). 
Martin explained the need for a licensed electrician in installing a chain-linked fence. (R. 
197:50, 52). Also, he acknowledged that Lee was not present throughout the complete 
installation of the fence, but Lee did most of the work and he was there "[t]he majority of 
the time." (R. 197:50, 55). Martin assisted. (R. 197:50). Also, he poured the concrete to 
secure the posts and design of the fence. (R. 197:50-51). 
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With respect to the foliage, Martin identified vines on the property (see R. 197:45-
46; Defendant's Exhibit 3); and he testified that he purchased a tree as a replacement for 
the elm, but did not know what to do with it. (R. 197:53-54). He contacted his attorney 
for advice and tried to communicate with the assistant district attorney but received no 
information. (R. 197:54). Martin testified that the tree was still available. (R. 197:54). 
After Martin testified, the trial court ruled as follows: 
I think [Mr. Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was 
not done as ordered by a third-party. 
At least what I've heard - and I'll let you address it if you want. One, I don't hear 
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact order. Two, the shrubbery, no real 
basis for finding that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is ambiguous. If it wasn't 
ambiguous, you wouldn't be offering that sapling as a replacement, that's -
certainly doesn't violate the letter; you've absolutely violated the spirit of the 
agreement. And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by a 
licensed third party. You know, one of the reasons was - that is, so we wouldn't 
have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you want, he was out 
there with a third-party doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at all 
times. 
(R. 197:55-56; see also id at 197:57 (stating the order required that "all work be[] done 
by a third-party, and you tell me he's just assisting, and somebody is looking over his 
shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, he's admitting that he wasn't 
supervised at all times by the third-party"); id_ at 197:59 ("My ruling as to the plea in 
abeyance goes solely to not having all work done by a licensed third-party, period."). 
The court then set the matter for sentencing. (See R. 197:66). 
On April 20, 2007, the trial court entered judgment against Martin for criminal 
mischief, and it sentenced Martin to probation for 24 months, among other things. (R. 
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131-33). On May 8, 2007, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision to clarify and 
correct the judgment. (R. 136-39). Martin's appeal challenges the trial court's ruling as 
it relates to the plea in abeyance agreement. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. On April 20, 2007, the 
trial court entered judgment against Martin on count "2. Criminal Mischief- Class A 
Misdemeanor." Where the State had originally charged count two as a "Third Degree 
Felony," the judgment reflected a reduced count. 
Thereafter, on May 8, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision to correct 
the judgment in part. The Memorandum Decision specifically made corrections to a 
dismissed count and to restitution. However, it did not amend or correct the conviction 
for count two. Indeed, the trial court reiterated its intent "to reduce, and the court hereby 
does reduce" that count from a third-degree-felony offense to a class A misdemeanor. 
Since the Memorandum Decision made no substantive changes to the conviction for 
count two, it did not affect the time for filing the notice of appeal from that count. Thus, 
Martin was required to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the original entry of 
judgment. Martin filed the notice of appeal on Monday, May 21, 2007. It was timely 
and proper under the rules. This Court may proceed with the appeal in this case. 
POINT II. Martin and the State entered into a plea-in-abeyance agreement, 
whereby Martin agreed to replace a fence and foliage in his neighbor's yard, and he 
agreed to have the work done by a licensed third party. Sometime after entering into the 
agreement, the State filed an order to show cause, alleging that Martin was in violation of 
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the agreement. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated the 
agreement because he assisted the third party in replacing the fence, and he was not 
supervised by the third party at all times in doing the work. Martin does not dispute the 
trial court's findings. Rather, he maintains that the plea-in-abeyance agreement did not 
prohibit him from assisting with the work and it did not require that all work be done 
totally, exclusively, and solely by the third party. 
In addition, to the extent the trial court intended the plea agreement to be so 
restrictive, it was required to ensure that when the parties entered into the agreement, it 
contained such terms explicitly and unambiguously. Since the agreement failed to set 
those terms out, the trial court could not later apply such terms against Martin for a 
violation of the agreement. Thus, based on the record here, the trial court erred in ruling 
that Martin was in violation of the agreement, and its error constituted an abuse of 
discretion. Martin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling on 
the matter and reinstate the agreement. 
In the event the terms of the agreement may be construed to require that all work 
be done totally and exclusively by the third party and to prohibit Martin from assisting, 
the agreement on that point is ambiguous. Indeed, Martin lacked a clear understanding of 
that essential part of the agreement. Thus, there was no meeting of the minds. As an 
alternative remedy, this Court may return the parties to their pre-plea position. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL IN 
THIS CASE. 
In an order dated August 31, 2007, this Court "specifically requested" that the 
parties address the issue of jurisdiction in their briefs. (See Addendum B.) The issue of 
jurisdiction apparently arose because the trial court announced, executed, and entered a 
final judgment in this case on April 20, 2007 (R. 131-33), then on May 8, 2007, it issued 
a Memorandum Decision that in part vacated the judgment. (See R. 136-39). Martin 
filed his notice of appeal on May 21, 2007. (R. 141). 
Both the State and Martin have acknowledged in papers filed with this Court, that 
this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, and the appeal is timely. (See "State's 
Response to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition," dated August 27, 2007; 
Defendant's "Memorandum in Opposition to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary 
Disposition," dated August 27, 2007). Indeed, the trial court's Memorandum Decision 
did not alter the conviction on the class A misdemeanor offense; thus, based on that entry 
of judgment and conviction, Martin filed a timely notice of appeal. 
Specifically, according to Rule 3, "[a]n appeal may be taken from a district or 
juvenile court to the appellate court. . . from all final orders and judgments. . . ." Utah R. 
App. P. 3(a). "In a criminal case, it is 'the sentence itself which constitutes a final judg-
ment from which appellant has the right to appeal.'" State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, | 4, 
57 P.3d 1065 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added 
in Bowers))', see State v. Walker, 2002 UT App 290, 1f 11, 55 P.3d 1165 (stating "a trial 
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court must impose a sentence in order to create a final, appealable order"). 
Also, '"once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction 
over the case.'" See State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, \ 10, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting 
State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
However, where the trial court has imposed an illegal sentence or has made a 
clerical error in the entry of judgment, the court may correct those matters at any time. 
According to Rule 30, a court may correct any mistake or defect in a judgment, order, or 
other part of the record at any time if the mistake or defect "aris[es] from oversight or 
omission." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) (2008); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2008) 
(stating a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time); State v. Garner, 2008 UT 
App 32, Tf 17, 177 P.3d 637 (stating application of Rule 22(e) is narrowly circumscribed). 
Such a correction may or may not affect the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, 
[Wjhere a belated entry merely constitutes an amendment or modification not 
changing the substance or character of the judgment, such entry is merely a nunc 
pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment was entered, 
and does not enlarge the time for appeal; but where the modification or 
amendment is in some material matter, the time begins to run from the time of the 
modification or amendment. 
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, |^ 11, 106 P.3d 729 (quoting Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947)) (emphasis added in Garner). 
In this case, the trial court entered judgment on April 20, 2007. (R. 131-33). It 
then entered a post-judgment Memorandum Decision that addressed the original 
judgment in three respects. (R. 136-39 (dated May 8, 2007)). First, the Memorandum 
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Decision vacated the sentence and conviction on count one in the Information, since the 
parties had agreed to have that count dismissed as part of the original plea agreement in 
this case. (See R. 51 (plea agreement reflecting that count one is dismissed); 138 
(Memorandum Decision reflecting that count one "is hereby vacated" pursuant to the plea 
agreement)). 
Second, the Memorandum Decision reiterated that the trial court intended to enter 
a reduced judgment of conviction on count two of the Information. Since the original 
judgment of conviction already reflected an entry of judgment for a reduction on count 
two (see R. 131), that portion of the Memorandum Decision did not change the substance 
or character of the original judgment, and it constituted a nunc pro tunc entry, relating 
back to the date of the original judgment. See_ Garner, 2005 UT 6, \ 11. 
Third, the Memorandum Decision discussed restitution. The trial court considered 
the restitution order to be an illegal sentence, and it set the original judgment aside for 
that reason. (R. 139). Yet an amendment to restitution "does not affect" the finality of a 
conviction and judgment for purposes of appeal. (See "State's Response to Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition," at 5 (citing Garner, 2005 UT 6, f^ 17)). Thus, where 
Martin filed a notice of appeal within 30 days from the original judgment of conviction, 
the appeal from the conviction was timely and proper. This Court has jurisdiction over 
that appeal. 
A. FIRST, THE MEMORANDUM DECISION CORRECTED ANY 
REFERENCE TO COUNT ONE IN THE INFORMATION. THAT WAS 
PROPER SINCE COUNT ONE WAS DISMISSED AS PART OF THE 
ORIGINAL PLEA AGREEMENT. 
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In November 2004, the State filed charges against Martin for two counts of felony 
criminal mischief. Count one was charged as a second-degree-felony offense, and count 
two was charged as a third-degree-felony offense. (See R. 3-5). On September 29, 2005, 
the State and Martin entered into an agreement, whereby the state dismissed count one 
and Martin entered a no-contest plea on count two. (R. 51-58). The trial court held the 
plea on count two in abeyance under certain terms and conditions while Martin was to 
replace damaged property. (See R. 55). 
In January 2007, the trial court determined that Martin had violated the plea 
agreement, and it "revoked" or terminated the plea in abeyance and set the matter for 
sentencing. (R. 124-25). On April 20, the trial court entered judgment against Martin 
for criminal mischief, and it sentenced him to probation for 24 months. (See R. 131-33). 
The executed judgment made reference to two counts for criminal mischief: count "1 . 
Criminal Mischief- 3rd Degree Felony," and count "2. Criminal Mischief- Class A 
Misdemeanor." (Id.) 
On May 8, 2007, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision to correct the 
reference to count one in the judgment. The court ruled that count one "should have 
been dismissed as part of the September 29, 2005, plea in abeyance." (R. 138, f 10). 
Since the April 20 judgment did not reflect the dismissal, it was incorrect. (See R. 131); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) & 30(b). Thus, the trial court stated, "with respect to that count," 
it would be "and is hereby vacated." (R. 138, ^ f 10). That was proper; nothing more was 
needed to correct the error relating to the dismissed count. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b); 
see also, e.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Lorrah 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) 
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(reflecting that clerical mistakes in judgments may be corrected at any time). 
B. SECOND, THE MEMORANDUM DECISION REITERATED THAT 
COUNT TWO SHOULD BE ENTERED AS A MISDEMEANOR 
CONVICTION. 
Next, the Memorandum Decision addressed the surviving count two for criminal 
mischief (See, e.g., R. 138, f^ 11; see also R. 51 (reflecting agreement that Martin would 
enter a no-contest plea on count two for criminal mischief)). According to the 
Memorandum, the court considered there to be confusion surrounding the judgment of 
conviction on that count. The court stated, "while the record is somewhat confused on 
this point, it was the court's intention to reduce, and the court hereby does reduce, Count 
II from a third-degree felony to a class A misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-402. In doing so, the court finds that the nature, circumstances, and history of this case 
are such that to enter Martin's conviction as a felony would be unduly harsh." (R. 138, <|f 
11 (emphasis added); see also R. 191:8-9 (reflecting that the court vacated the sentence 
for restitution, "entered a conviction only for a Class A Misdemeanor as to Count II", and 
set the matter for June 8)). 
Notably, that language in the Memorandum Decision did not constitute an 
amendment to the judgment. The court had already entered judgment on count two as a 
class A misdemeanor. (R. 131-33). Thus, if anything, the language for the surviving 
count may be treated as a nunc pro tunc entry under Garner, 2005 UT 6, [^ 11. It may 
date back to the original judgment, see_ id_, entered on April 20. (See R. 131-33). 
Since the May 8 Memorandum Decision did not alter the conviction and judgment 
on the surviving count two, Martin was required to perfect his appeal within 30 days of 
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the April 20 judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a) & 4(a) (stating an appellant must file a 
notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment). In this case, Martin filed the first 
notice of appeal on Monday, May 21, 2007. (R. 141). That was appropriate and timely. 
See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 22(a) (2008) (stating when the last day of the period falls on a 
Sunday, the period for filing extends to the next business day). 
Assuming arguendo, the Memorandum Decision served as a material modification 
to the original judgment of conviction, the May 8 Memorandum Decision sufficiently 
resolved count one {see supra, Argument, Point LA., herein; R. 138, % 10 (specifying that 
count one "is hereby vacated")), and any misunderstanding as to count two {see R. 138, \ 
11 (specifying that the court "hereby does reduce" the conviction for count two as 
reflected in the original judgment)), to restart the time for filing the notice of appeal. See 
Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 11. Thus, when Martin filed the notice of appeal on May 21, it was 
timely. {See R. 141). This Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal. 
C. THIRD, THE MEMORANDUM DECISION VACATED SENTENCING AS 
IT RELATED TO RESTITUTION. THAT DID NOT AFFECT THE TIME FOR 
FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THIS CASE. THUS, MARTIN TIMELY 
PERFECTED THE APPEAL WHEN HE FILED A NOTICE ON MAY 21. 
Finally, the Memorandum Decision dealt with restitution. The court considered it 
necessary to address restitution under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, and it believed 
that in order to address restitution, it would have to declare the entire sentence illegal and 
void. {See R. 191:2-3). Defense counsel disagreed with the trial court's characterization. 
(R. 191:3). Nevertheless, the trial court ruled it would "set[] aside the sentence" in order 
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to address restitution. (R. 138-39).l That was improper. 
As the State has asserted in papers filed with this Court, 
[T]he district judge lacked jurisdiction to set aside a valid sentence at that point, 
and his anticipated review of the restitution issue did not affect the finality of the 
judgment and sentence for purposes of appeal. Before considering the restitution 
issue, the district court judge had corrected the sentencing errors, leaving a valid 
conviction and sentence for a class A misdemeanor. 
("State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition," at 7 (citing Garner, 
2005 UT 6; Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, % 10 (stating "'once a court imposes a valid 
sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case'")). Also, according to the 
State, it would be "unnecessary for the lower court to set aside the entire sentence in 
order to impose sentence and restitution at the same time." ("State's Response to Sua 
Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition," at 7). 
Indeed, the supreme court's decision in State v. Garner governs this situation. In 
Garner, the court ruled that the time for an appeal will not be stayed for finality in 
restitution. "We hold that where orders for restitution remain open to be decided at a 
1
 The trial court indicated in open court that it would vacate the sentence. (See R. 191). 
However, according to the executed Memorandum Decision, the court "vacate[d]" only 
that portion of the judgment relating to count one (R. 136, 138), and it "set[] aside" the 
sentence for restitution. (R. 138-39; see also Ruling, dated August 29, 2007 (stating the 
sentence is vacated as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of "5/8/07" )). Indeed, the 
executed Memorandum Decision does not support that the court vacated or set aside the 
conviction on count two; it supports the opposite where the court intended to reduce and 
"hereby does reduce" the conviction on that count. (R. 138); see also CCD, L. C. v. 
Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ^ 33 n.2, 116 P.3d 366 (refusing to treat the court's remarks from 
the bench as the final pronouncement where the court also entered written findings and 
conclusions). Thus, according to the executed documents, the trial court entered 
judgment of conviction against Martin for count two on April 20 (R. 131-33), and it 
clarified that judgment but did not modify it in any material way in the Memorandum 
Decision entered on May 8. (R. 138). 
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later date, the subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not a new and final 
judgment for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction." 2005 
UT 6, H 17. Accordingly, if a defendant files a notice of appeal from the restitution order 
rather than from the judgment of conviction, the appeal will not be timely for purposes of 
the conviction and underlying proceedings. To be timely, an appeal must be perfected 
from the judgment of conviction. See_ id_ 
Although the trial court in this case set aside the judgment and ordered further pro-
ceedings for restitution (see R. 139), that is not sufficient to delay the appeal. See 
Garner, 2005 UT 6, ffif 15-17; see also Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (stating that the time for an 
appeal will be extended only under certain specified conditions). The trial court had 
already executed a judgment and conviction on the class A misdemeanor. (See R. 131-
33; 138). Thus, Martin was required to perfect his appeal from the entry of the judgment 
and conviction. See Garner, 2005 UT 6, \ 17 (stating an order on restitution is not a 
judgment "for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction"). In 
this case, the notice of appeal filed from the judgment of conviction is timely and 
sufficient. (See R. 131-33; 141); Utah R. App. P. 3(a) & 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction 
to proceed with the appeal on the merits. 
POINT II. IN THIS CASE, THE TRIAL COURT FOUND MARTIN TO BE 
IN VIOLATION OF TERMS THAT WERE NOT EXPLICITLY SET 
FORTH IN THE PLEA AGREEMENT. THAT WAS ERROR IN THE 
EVENT THE AGREEMENT MAY BE CONSTRUED TO SUPPORT A 
VIOLATION, THE TERMS WERE AMBIGUOUS AND THE PARTIES 
MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL PRE-PLEA POSITION AS 
A REMEDY. 
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A. THE LAW REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT TERMS IN A PLEA AGREEMENT 
TO BE EXPLICIT AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
Title 77, Chapter 2a governs plea-in-abeyance agreements. It states the following: 
(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the 
defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the 
requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for 
requesting the court to hold the plea in abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the 
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be 
executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in 
the presence of the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4) (2003); see also id_ at § 77-2a-l(l) (2003) (indicating 
conditions are "as set forth" in the plea-in-abeyance agreement); State v. Turnbow, 2001 
UT App 59,^flO,21P.3d 249 (defining a plea-in-abeyance agreement). 
Rule 11 also governs plea agreements. It states that a court may not accept a plea 
in a case until it has made findings as to "what agreement has been reached." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (2008). To that end, "[t]he trial judge should [still] review the 
statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by [rule 111 on the record" 
before accepting the plea. State v. LehU 2003 UT App 212, \ 10, 73 P.3d 985 (bracketed 
language in the original); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (stating that a finding regarding 
the plea agreement "may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record" or a 
"written statement" where the court has established that "the defendant has read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement"). 
The terms of a plea agreement must be explicit and unambiguous. See_ United 
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Slates v. Burns, 160 F.3d 82, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing that "significant plea-
agreement terms should be stated explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude their 
subsequent circumvention by either party"); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, Tf 
19, 69 P.3d 838 (stating "c[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be 
clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea 
colloquy'") (cite omitted). 
The trial court must ensure that the agreement is clear to all parties and it must 
ensure that defendant has a full understanding of the terms and conditions of the plea. 
See, e.g. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203 (stating the purpose of Rule 11 
is to ensure defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and he is aware of the conse-
quences of a plea); see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) (stating 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and 
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered"). 
In addition, "[m]any courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts and have applied 
principles derived from contract law to plea agreements." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 
386 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing as examples Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
(1971); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (referring to contract law in 
determining whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea)). 
However, there are limits to application of those principles. In Patience, this 
Court stated, "although courts recognize that' [principles of contract law provide a 
useful analytic framework' in cases involving plea agreements, they also recognize that 
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there are limits to the contract analogy, and that contract principles 'cannot be blindly 
incorporated into the criminal law in the area of plea bargaining.'" 944 P.2d at 387 
(quoting United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir.1980); see also United 
States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541, 542 (8th Cir.1990) (stating "[p]lea agreements are 
like contracts; however, they are not contracts, and therefore contract doctrines do not 
always apply to them," and that "[t]his court has . . . acknowledged the inherent limits of 
the contract analogy") (emphasis in original)). 
In the application of contract law, "'plea agreements may require tempering in 
some instances.'" Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 (quoting People v. Evans, 673 N.E.2d 244, 
247 (111. 1996)). "For example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their vali-
dity, courts may in certain circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than 
the defendant." M (citing United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993) 
("c[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the government to a 
greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or ambiguities in 
plea agreements'") (quoting United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986))). 
Indeed, a court may construe ambiguities against the government and in favor of 
the defendant. See, e.g.. United States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); 
see also United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Altro, 
180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). That is because, unlike ordinary contracts, the 
government enjoys significant bargaining power and the plea agreement calls for a 
defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g. Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; 
Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523. Also, where probation agreements are concerned, a court must 
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find that defendant willfully violated the terms of the agreement in order for the violation 
to justify revocation of defendant's probation. See, e.g.. State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, f^ 34, 
127 P.3d 1213 (stating that "[t]o revoke probation for failure to pay restitution, a court 
must find that the probationer willfully refused to pay or that he failed to make sufficient 
bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money"); Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277 
(stating in order to revoke probation, a violation must, as a general rule, be willful). A 
finding of willfulness "requires a finding that the probationer did not make bona fide 
efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." Peterson, 869 P.2d at 991 (quoting State 
v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
When there is disagreement as to the terms of an agreement, the parties may be put 
back into their original pre-plea positions. In State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 
582, the defendant and State entered into a plea agreement wherein the defendant pled 
guilty to a charge of criminal nonsupport and agreed to pay "total victim restitution." Id_ 
at ffl[ 3, 10. Thereafter, the trial court ordered defendant to pay arrearages outside the time 
period alleged in the information. Id_ at f^ 4. Defendant challenged that order on appeal. 
Id. This Court reversed the trial court order and vacated the plea. 
It ruled there was "no meeting of the minds as to the meaning of 'total victim resti-
tution,5" and therefore, "the parties failed 'to reach a mutually desirable agreement.'" Id_ 
at ]^ 15 (quoting West, 765 P.2d at 896 (discussing how contract law principles are 
applicable to plea agreements); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31 (1991) ("Where 
after the parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a contract, circumstances 
disclosed a latent ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the 
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parties meant one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence 
of the supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract.") (footnote omitted)). 
Also, it looked to language in State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44 (Utah 1982), to determine 
the appropriate remedy: "The court should understand clearly and make sure the parties 
understand clearly the terms which they have agreed to before acting upon the [plea] 
agreement. Where there is an error, frequently it can be most easily corrected by placing 
the parties in their original positions. As long as the defendant retains constitutional 
protections, no harm need be suffered." Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 16 (quoting Bero, 
645 P.2d at 47). In Bickley, the court found that "both parties to the plea agreement 
lacked clear understanding of certain terms to which they allegedly agreed. If an agree-
ment is reasonably disputed, or if there is some misunderstanding, it is the responsibility 
of the trial court to assure that the agreement is clear to all parties before ordering 
restitution beyond that alleged in the information." IcL (citing Berg_, 645 P.2d at 47). 
Since "both parties lacked a clear understanding of what was meant by total victim 
restitution, this situation 'can be most easily corrected by placing [Defendant and the 
State] in their original positions.'" IcL (bracketed language in original) (citing Bero, 645 
P.2d at 47); see also United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 1996) (recog-
nizing that an ambiguity "in an essential term or a mutual mistake about the meaning of 
such a term can invalidate" a plea agreement), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 156 (1996). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT MARTIN VIOLATED THE 
AGREEMENT BY ASSISTING THE LICENSED THIRD PARTY WITH THE 
WORK; YET THE PLEA AGREEMENT DID NOT PROHIBIT MARTIN 
FROM ASSISTING. 
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In this case, Martin and the State entered into a plea agreement on September 29, 
2005, wherein Martin entered into a no-contest plea for criminal mischief, and he agreed 
to replace a fence and foliage that "was removed from the yard" of Ms. Randazzo. (R. 
188:11). Also, the State requested, and counsel for Martin agreed, that the repair work 
was to be done "by a licensed third party because there is still some animosity with 
[Martin] personally being there." (R. 188:13; 55). In addition, Martin was under a "no 
contact" order; he was prohibited from trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. (R. 9). 
On July 28, 2006, the state filed an order to show cause alleging violations to the 
plea agreement. (R. 108-110). On January 19, 2007, the trial court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause. (R. 197). At the conclusion of the 
evidence and over the objections of defense counsel, the trial court ruled that Martin had 
violated the terms of the plea agreement when he assisted the third party with the work. 
The judge stated, "color it however you want, [Martin] was out there with a third-party 
doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at all times." (R. 197:56; see also 
R. 197:56-58 (reflecting defense counsel's argument that the agreement did not prohibit 
Martin from assisting; also Martin did the best he could to comply with the agreement)). 
In this case, the trial court's ruling was in error. Martin was not in violation of the 
terms of the plea agreement: the repair work was done by a licensed third party with 
assistance from Martin. (See R. 197:47-53, 55). The agreement did not prohibit Martin 
from assisting with the work and it did not require that all work be done totally, exclu-
sively, and solely by the third party. (See R. 55; 188:11-13). Where the terms of the 
agreement were not so restrictive, the trial court erred in ruling that Martin violated them. 
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Moreover, to the extent the agreement may be ambiguous on that point, it must be 
construed in Martin's favor. (See infra, Argument, Point II.B.(l)). In addition, if the 
agreement may be construed to prohibit Martin from doing the work, Martin did not 
understand it to say as much, and he should be placed back in his pre-plea position. (See 
infra, Argument, Point II.B.(2)). 
(1) Martin Did Not Violate the Terms and Conditions of the Plea Agreement. 
Utah statutory law states the following, 
If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement information 
comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant 
has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the request of the 
prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, or upon its own 
motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a 
designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the terms 
of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be 
terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant 
has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in 
abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of 
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the 
original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and imposition 
of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to 
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (2003); Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, Tf 10; see also id at \ 
14 (recognizing that a "plea in abeyance differs from probation in both its statutory 
provisions and function. Thus, cases decided under the probation statutes are not directly 
applicable to pleas in abeyance"). 
In this case, the trial court determined that Martin violated the terms of the plea 
agreement by doing some of the work himself. It stated, 
26 
I think [Mr. Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was 
not done as ordered by a third-party. 
At least what I've heard - and I'll let you address it if you want. One, I don't hear 
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact order. Two, the shrubbery, no real 
basis for finding that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is ambiguous. If it wasn't 
ambiguous, you wouldn't be offering that sapling as a replacement, that's -
certainly doesn't violate the letter; you've absolutely violated the spirit of the 
agreement. And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by a 
licensed third party. You know, one of the reasons was - that is, so we wouldn't 
have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you want, he was out 
there with a third-party doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at 
all times. 
(R. 197:55-56 (emphasis added); see also id. at 197:57 (stating the order required that "all 
work be[] done by a third-party, and you tell me he's just assisting, and somebody is 
looking over his shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, he's admitting that 
he wasn't supervised at all times by the third-party"); id_ at 197:59 ("My ruling as to the 
plea in abeyance goes solely to not having all work done by a licensed third-party")). 
The trial court relied on Martin's testimony for that ruling. (See R. 197:55-56 (stating "I 
think [Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was not done as 
ordered by a third-party")). 
Martin does not dispute that the evidence presented at the order-to-show-cause 
hearing supports that he was "out there with a third-party doing the work," he "wasn't 
supervised at all times by the third-party" (R. 197:56, 57), and he did not have all work 
done solely by the licensed third party. (R. 197:59). 
According to the evidence, Martin replaced the fence and reinforced it with help 
from a third-party licensed electrician/handyman, Evan Lee. (R. 197:47, 48). A letter 
from Lee stated that he assisted in installing the fence; also he was a licensed electrician. 
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(R. 197:48, 51; Defendant's Exhibits 5 & 7). Martin acknowledged that Lee and he did 
the work on the fence; Martin assisted when needed; and he was able to assist without 
trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. (R. 197:49-50, 52-53; see also R. 197:32-33, 36 
(Stacey Poppleton saw Martin working on the corner end post fitting an end cap)). 
Martin explained the need for a licensed electrician in installing a chain-linked fence. (R. 
197:50,52). 
Also, he acknowledged that Lee was not present throughout the complete 
installation of the fence, but Lee did most of the work and he was there "[t]he majority of 
the time." (R. 197:50, 55). Martin assisted. (R. 197:50). Martin poured the concrete to 
secure the posts and design of the fence. (R. 197:50-51). 
In addition, Martin discussed the vines on Ms. Randazzo's property (see R. 
197:45-46; Defendant's Exhibit 3); and he testified that he purchased a tree as a 
replacement for the elm, but did not know what to do with it. (R. 197:53-54). He 
contacted his attorney for advice and tried communicating with the assistant district 
attorney but received no information. (R. 197:54). Martin testified that the tree was still 
available. (R. 197:54). 
Based on the evidence, Martin was in substantial compliance with the terms of the 
plea agreement: according to his testimony, the work was done by a licensed third party 
with assistance from Martin. (R. 197:47-50, 52-53, 55). 
Indeed, the plea agreement did not prohibit Martin from assisting with or doing 
some of the work; and it did not mandate that a third party do all the work or supervise 
Martin at all times. By its explicit terms, it required Martin to "replace the chain link 
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fence and replant an elm tree that [he] removedf,] and [to] replace the shrubs destroyed 
and to have the work done by a licensed third party." (R. 55; see also R. 188:11-13 
(requesting that the repair work "be done by a licensed third party because there is still 
some animosity with him personally being there")). 
Where the plea agreement did not prohibit Martin from assisting, the trial court 
found a violation for something that was not set forth in the agreement. See, e.g.. Burns, 
160 F.3d at 83 (recognizing that significant terms of a plea agreement should be stated 
explicitly and unambiguously "so as to preclude their subsequent circumvention by either 
party"); see also Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^ j 19 (stating "'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities 
in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised 
in the course of the plea colloquy'") (cite omitted). That was error. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-2a-2(4)(a) (requiring the plea agreement to include "a full, detailed 
recitation" of requirements and conditions); 77-2a-4(l) (stating that the trial court may 
terminate the agreement where the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any 
"term or condition" of the agreement). 
To the extent any part of the plea agreement may be construed to preclude Martin 
from doing any work or from assisting the third-party licensed contractor, those terms 
were not plainly set out. Thus, they may not be applied against Martin. That is because 
the law requires conditions to be set forth in the plea agreement at the time of the plea. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4) (stating the plea agreement "shall include a full, 
detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant"; stating 
the plea shall be in writing); see also id_ at § 77-2a-l(l) (2003) (stating specific 
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conditions are "as set forth" in the plea agreement); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (stating the 
trial court may not accept a plea until it has made findings as to "what agreement has 
been reached"); Mora, 2003 UT App 117, lj 19 (stating "'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities 
in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised 
in the course of the plea colloquy'") (cite omitted). 
At best, the trial court's interpretation of the plea agreement at the order-to-show-
cause hearing rendered the agreement ambiguous with respect to whether the third party 
was required to do the work totally, exclusively, or solely; or whether Martin may assist. 
See, e.g., Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, fflf 13-15 (recognizing ambiguity surrounding the 
phrase "total victim restitution"). Where terms are ambiguous, a court will construe them 
against the government. See, e.g., In re Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523. 
That is because unlike ordinary contracts, a plea agreement calls for a defendant to waive 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
Thus, it was improper for the trial court to clarify or interpret the agreement at the 
order-to-show-cause hearing to require that all work be done by the licensed third party 
and without assistance from Martin. See, e.g., Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^j 12-13 
(recognizing the trial court failed to firmly establish defendant's responsibilities at the 
time of the agreement, thereby resulting in error); see also Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^ j 22 
(stating the purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary 
and he is aware of the consequences of a plea); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (stating "Rule 
11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 
11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered"); Mora, 2003 UT 
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App 117, If 19 (stating c"[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified 
during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea 
colloquy'") (cite omitted). 
In the end, Martin did not violate the terms of the agreement; he made bona fide 
efforts to satisfy the agreement by assisting the licensed third party in doing the work. 
He was in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions. To the extent the 
agreement may be construed as represented by the trial judge at the order-to-show-cause 
hearing, that construction was not explained to Martin when he entered into the 
agreement, and cannot apply to him at this juncture, see, e.g., Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 
^ 12; also, that construction was ambiguous. Thus, the trial court's ruling in finding a 
violation was in error. In light of the agreement (R. 55) and the evidence (supra, pp. 27-
28; R. 197:47-50, 52-53, 55), the trial court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Martin respectfully requests that this Court reinstate the agreement since Martin was not 
in violation of its terms and conditions. 
(2) In the Alternative, if the Agreement Is Construed to Prohibit Martin from 
Doing Any of the Work or Assisting the Third Party in Any Way, Martin Did 
Not Understand It to Require Such. Thus, the Parties Should Be Placed Back in 
Their Pre-Plea Position. 
As stated supra, the plea agreement here required Martin to "replace the chain link 
fence and replant an elm tree that [he] removed[,] and [to] replace the shrubs destroyed 
and to have the work done by a licensed third party." (R. 55; see also R. 188:11-13). In 
the event the agreement may be construed to mean that Martin was not required to 
actually do those things, but that he was required to arrange for a third party to do those 
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things totally, solely, and exclusively, without assistance from Martin, those terms were 
not set out in the agreement at the time of the plea (see supra, Argument, Point II.B.(l); 
R. 55; 188:11-13 (reflecting plea agreement and discussions; also, no indication that the 
trial court explained to Martin that he could not assist and that all work must be done 
exclusively and solely by a third party)); and Martin did not understand the agreement to 
prohibit him from assisting. (See, e.g., R. 197:47-50, 52-53, 55 (Martin's testimony at 
the hearing); see also R. 197:56-58). That is trial court error. 
The trial court must ensure that at the time of the plea, the agreement is clear to the 
parties and the defendant has a full understanding of the terms and conditions of the plea. 
See Martinez, 2001 UT 12, \ 22 (stating the purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure defendant's 
plea is knowing and voluntary and he is aware of the consequences); see also Gibbons, 
740 P.2d at 1312 (stating "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty 
plea is entered"). 
Under principles of contract law, where the agreement was susceptible to different 
interpretations and Martin's understanding differed from that of the other party, there was 
no meeting of the minds. See Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ^ 15 (recognizing the parties 
failed to reach mutual agreement and there was no meeting of the minds as to what "total 
victim restitution" constituted) (citing inter alia, 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31 (1991) 
("Where after the parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a contract, circumstances 
disclosed a latent ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the 
parties meant one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence 
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of the supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract.'5) (footnote omitted)). 
The record supports that Martin "lacked [a] clear understanding of certain terms" 
in the plea agreement, Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, f^ 16, and the agreement was disputed. 
As an alternative remedy, the matter "'can be most easily corrected by placing 
[Defendant and the State] in their original positions. As long as the defendant retains 
constitutional protections, no harm need be suffered."' Id_ at f^ 16 (quoting Berv, 645 
P.2d at 47). Martin maintains that is an appropriate remedy here. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and as supported by papers filed with this Court, 
this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Martin respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court ruling since Martin was not in violation of the plea agreement. As 
a remedy, this Court may reinstate the agreement. In the alternative, this Court may 
return the parties to their original pre-plea position. 
SUBMITTED this A^ day of j\q\j , 2008. 
Lirfda M. Jones 7j^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an 
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this 1^ day of Mfl/ , 2008. 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this day of _ fAa\I 2008. 
34 
Tab A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL C MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041907590 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: April 20, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KURUMADA, KEVIN J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 28, 1963 
Video 
Tape Count: 9-27-12 
CHARGES 
1. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 03/09/2007 Guilty 
2. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 03/09/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 041907590 
Date: Apr 20, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 3 65 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders both counts to run Concurrent should defendant violate 
probation. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1000.00 
$0.00 
$875.00 
$1875.00 
Charge # 2 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$1000.00 
$0 
$875.00 
$1875.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1875.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Good Behavior Probation 
No further violations. 
No contact with Victim. 
to be supervised by the Court. 
Page 2 
Case No: 041907590 
Date: Apr 20, 2 0 07 
Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw - Court denies Motion. 
Defendant moves to withdraw his plea, State objects - Court denies 
motion. 
Dated this 2&h day of (kft/uk / 2 0 ^ 7 . 
DENO HB40NAS 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL C. MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 041907590 
Judge: Deno G. Himonas 
f 1 The court issues this Memorandum Decision to clarify certain oral rulings in this 
matter and to vacate an illegally entered sentence. Specifically, this Memorandum Decision 
addresses the motion of the defendant, Michael Martin, to withdraw his guilty plea, the court's 
reduction of Martin's third-degree felony conviction to a class A misdemeanor pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402, and the setting aside of the sentence the court imposed on April 20, 2007. 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
1(2 On September 29, 2005, Martin entered a plea of "no contest" to one count of 
criminal mischief, a third-degree felony. The court, after engaging Martin in a colloquy under Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11, accepted the plea, but held it in abeyance for a period of twelve months under certain 
terms and conditions. 
T[3 In support of his plea, Martin executed the Statement of the Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certification of Counsel (the "Statement of the Defendant"), which the court 
incorporated into the record by reference. The Statement of the Defendant specifically provides in 
bold lettering immediately above Martin's signature "that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to 
withdraw from the plea agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest." 
T|4 On Monday, October 31, 2005, Martin sent the court a letter indicating he wished to 
withdraw his plea, hi the letter, Martin wrote that he understood that "the contract [he] signed before 
. . . [the] court allowed for 30 days in which he could change a plea." On May 12, 2006, Martin 
changed his mind again and withdrew his motion to withdraw his plea.1 
Tf5 Thereafter, on July 28, 2006, the State filed an Affidavit in Support of an Order to 
Show Cause alleging that Martin had violated the terms and conditions of his plea in abeyance by 
failing in a number of regards to make restitution. Martin denied the allegations. 
[^6 The court held an evidentiary hearing on January 19, 2007, to resolve the Order to 
Show Cause. Based upon the evidence presented, the court revoked the plea in abeyance and set 
sentencing for March 9, 2007. 
Tf7 At the March hearing, Martin indicated anew that he wanted to withdraw his original 
plea in abeyance. The court continued the sentencing to April 20, 2007, in order to afford Martin 
an opportunity to investigate whether there was a good faith basis for doing so. 
Tf8 Martin did not bring a written motion. Instead, he appeared on April 20th and made 
an oral motion to withdraw his plea. The basis for his request was that he was having a land survey 
done that he thought would give him some new evidence. 
f9 As the court observed at the hearing on April 20th, there is nothing "new" about 
Martin's evidence. Martin could have had a survey performed, and known of its results, not months, 
but years ago. He did not. Instead, he waited for some 19 months after his plea in abeyance to make 
this argument. Consequently, Martin's request is (1) substantively defective as there is no basis for 
The court notes that Martin has been represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. 
Martin's counsel, however, has never filed a motion to withdraw the plea; rather, Martin has always 
made such requests directly. 
2 
the court to conclude that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made,2 and (2) procedurally 
defective as extremely untimely. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. Therefore, the court denies Martin's 
request to withdraw his plea. 
402 Reduction 
TflO The State originally charged Martin with two counts of criminal mischief, the first 
a second-degree felony and the second a third-degree felony. Count I, the second-degree felony 
should have been dismissed as part of the September 29,2005, plea in abeyance. Consequently, the 
sentence the court imposed on April 20th with respect to that count was illegal and is hereby vacated. 
Tf 11 Moreover, and while the record is somewhat confused on this point, it was the court's 
intention to reduce, and the court hereby does reduce, Count II from a third-degree felony to a class 
A misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. In doing so, the court finds that the nature, 
circumstances, and history of this case are such that to enter Martin's conviction as a felony would 
be unduly harsh. 
Restitution 
f 12 As the parties are aware, the court ordered Martin to make restitution in connection 
with the plea in abeyance. Martin's efforts in this regard ultimately fell short and led to the order 
to show cause. 
Tfl3 At the April 20th hearing, the court declined to make restitution a part of the sentence, 
hi making this determination, the court neglected to address or consider the statutory requirements 
2New evidence may provide a basis for withdrawing a plea. See State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 
1040, 1042 (Utah 1987) ("critical new evidence" justified the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea). 
Martin, however, does not present anything new or that he could not been learned long ago through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. Instead, he uses his unsupported requests to withdraw his plea in an 
apparent effort to delay the proceedings. 
3 
and factors set forth in the Crime Victims Restitution Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-38a-l0l,etseq. (the 
"Act"). 
f^l 4 This failure, in the view of the court, resulted in sentence being imposed in an illegal 
maimer.3 Cf. State v. Hon. William Barrett, 2004 UT App. 239, *6 (The district court's failure to 
comply with the Act justified the grant of an extraordinary writ requiring the district court to 
"consider the statutorily required factors, and make the required determinations of complete and 
court-ordered restitution amounts, with the supporting reasons on the record.") The court therefore 
sets aside the sentence imposed at the April 20th hearing and will proceed to resentence Martin at 
9:00 a.m. on June 8, 2007. 
DATED this Q_ day of May, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
The court notes that prior to reaching its decision on this issue, it apprised counsel for the 
parties of its concerns and invited further argument on the manner. This hearing was held on the 
morning of May 8, 2007. 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 3 1 2007 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael Martin, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20070426-CA 
This matter is before the court'on a sua sponte motion for 
summary disposition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition is withdrawn, and a ruling on the issues raised 
therein is deferred pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. See Utah R. App. P. 10. The parties 
are specifically requested to include a discussion of the issues 
related to jurisdiction in their briefs for full consideration by 
the court. 
Dated this of August, 2 0 07 
FOR THE COURT: 
d^£i^>?Td^\ 
Caro/lyn B. McHugh, Sfmdge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 31, 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
LINDA M JONES 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MARK L SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
KRIS C LEONARD 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this August 31, 2007. 
By yffs/uj^£^rt^z^7rs*?d 
Deputy Cle%k \ 
Case No. 20070426 
District Court No. 041907590 
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Utah R. App. P. 3 (2008) 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district 
or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant 
to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a 
judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may 
file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate 
timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single 
appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its 
own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate 
appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant 
and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be 
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate 
court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original 
application shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties 
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; 
shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to 
which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the filing 
of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record 
of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by counsel, then 
on the party at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall 
be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the certificate of service 
shall designate the name of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or cross 
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court 
the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of 
appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the 
required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the 
1 
notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 
or a certification by the clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate 
court. Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court 
shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given 
to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does 
not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title. 
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Utah R. App. P. 4 (2008) 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in 
a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all 
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the 
motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry 
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry 
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to 
appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any 
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of 
appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.(c) Filing prior to 
entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, 
judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after 
such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other 
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
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than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the 
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial 
court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing 
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate 
the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such reinstatement 
shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the 
defendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The 
prosecutor shall have 30 days after service of the motion to file a written response. If the 
prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may 
present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to appeal, it shall enter an 
order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution 
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely 
filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for 
filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting 
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of 
appeal is filed in the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
Advisory Committee Note: 
Subsection (f) was adopted to implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning 
v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(2008) 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or 
not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant 
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for 
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In 
cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which 
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
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(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and 
if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, 
a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(0 Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the 
court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is 
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. 
The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of 
the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise 
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
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(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of 
the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for lender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with 
the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant 
to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may 
enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of 
any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
3 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 (2008) 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days 
after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue 
or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make 
a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be 
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, 
defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to 
appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the 
verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise 
the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be 
filed. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as 
defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in 
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, 
receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the 
plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment 
setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall 
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's 
return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a 
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 30 (2008) 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and 
after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l (2003). Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution 
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, 
at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon 
him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, 
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-l, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 82, § 3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2 (2003). Plea in abeyance agreement —Negotiation — 
Contents —Terms of agreement —Waiver of time for sentencing. 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry 
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon motion of 
both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and not enter 
judgment of conviction against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant 
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a plea in 
abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any plea in abeyance 
agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court hearing 
relating to a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(4) (a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
the defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of 
the requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for 
requesting the court to hold the plea in abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the 
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be 
executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in 
the presence of the court. 
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the 
plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea was to any 
degree of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and felonies. 
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, 
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before the court, and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives time for 
sentencing as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-2, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 82, § 4. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3 (Supp. 2007). Manner of entry of plea-Powers of 
court. 
(l)(a) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement shall 
be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
(b) In cases charging offenses for which bail may be forfeited, a plea in abeyance 
agreement may be entered into without a personal appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon finding 
that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the case. 
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may reduce the degree of the offense or dismiss the case 
only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon 
sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, 
the court may not invoke Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the 
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on probation to 
the court under Section 77-18-1. 
(5) The terms of a plea in abeyance agreement may include: 
(a) an order that the defendant pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, with a 
surcharge based on the amount of the plea in abeyance fee, both of which shall be 
allocated in the same manner as if paid as a fine for a criminal conviction under 
Section 78-3-14.5 and a surcharge under Title 63, Chapter 63a, Crime Victim 
Reparation Trust, Public Safety Support Funds, Substance Abuse Prevention 
Account, and Services for Victims of Domestic Violence Account, and which may 
not exceed in amount the maximum fine and surcharge which could have been 
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense; 
(b) an order that the defendant pay restitution to the victims of his actions as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
(c) an order that the defendant pay the costs of any remedial or rehabilitative 
program required by the terms of the agreement; and 
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(d) an order that the defendant comply with any other conditions which could have 
been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the 
same offense. 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney not to agree 
to a plea in abeyance is final. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense 
against a victim who is under the age of 14. 
(8) Beginning on July 1, 2008, no plea may be held in abeyance in any case 
involving a driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502. 
Laws 1993, c. 82, § 5; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 5, eff May 
6, 2002; Laws 2004, c. 203, § 2, eff May 3, 2004; Laws 2004, c. 228, § 7, eff. July 1, 2006; 
Laws 2006, c. 341, § 9, eff. July 1, 2006. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3.1 (Supp. 2007). Restrictions on pleas to driving under 
the influence violations. 
(1) As used in this section, a "driving under the influence court" means an 
intensive judicially supervised treatment program: 
(a) as defined by rules of the Utah Judicial Council; and 
(b) that has been approved by the Utah Judicial Council as a driving under the 
influence court. 
(2)(a) A plea may not be held in abeyance in any case involving a driving under 
the influence violation under Section 4 l-6a-502 that is punishable as a felony or 
class A misdemeanor. 
(b) A plea to a driving under the influence violation under Section 41 -6a-502 that 
is punishable as a class B misdemeanor may not be held in abeyance unless: 
(i)(A) the plea is entered pursuant to participation in a driving under the influence 
court; and 
(B) the plea is approved by the district attorney, county attorney, attorney general, 
or chief prosecutor of a municipality; or 
(ii) evidentiary issues or other circumstances justify resolution of the case with a 
plea in abeyance. 
(3) A plea to a driving under the influence violation under Section 4 l-6a-502 may 
not be dismissed or entered as a conviction of a lesser offense pursuant to Subsection 
(2)(b)(i) if the defendant: 
(a) has been convicted of any other violation which is defined as a conviction 
under Subsection 41 -6a-501(2); 
(b) has had a plea to any other violation of Section 41-6a-502 held in abeyance; or 
(c) in the current case: 
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(i) operated a vehicle in a negligent manner proximately resulting in bodily injury 
to another or property damage to an extent requiring reporting to a law 
enforcement agency under Section 41-6a-401; 
(ii) had a blood or breath alcohol level of. 16 or higher; or 
(iii) had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
Laws 2004, c. 228, § 8, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 2, § 306, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2006, 
c. 341, § 10, eff. July 1,2006. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (2003). Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — 
Hearing—Entry of judgment and imposition of sentence-Subsequent 
prosecutions. 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information 
comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has 
violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting 
attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an 
order requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to 
show cause why the court should not find the terms of the agreement to have been 
violated and why the agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary 
hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any 
term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and 
enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to 
which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and 
imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior 
to termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent 
prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition 
of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed in abeyance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-4, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 82, § 6. 
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